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Corporate governance is an important determinant of corporate performance. Poor corporate 
governance can damage the interests of shareholders, and may lead to business collapse. This 
paper expands the literature on credit risk management by assessing the effectiveness of aspects 
of corporate governance for predicting financial distress in a dynamic discrete-time survival 
analysis model. It is a comprehensive, up-to-date and thorough study, which uses a large range 
of corporate governance measures, financial ratios and macroeconomic variables in a panel data 
structure over a 17-year period. Furthermore, the paper addresses the relationship between 
government ownership and the risk of financial distress in China. The results suggest that 
although corporate governance alone is not sufficient to accurately predict financial distress, it 
can add to the predictive power of financial ratios and macroeconomic factors. In addition, the 
model provides insights into the role of state ownership, independent directors, institutional 
investors and some personal characteristics of the Chair of the board. Implications are made 
regarding them and the debt and bankruptcy problem in China and Asia. 
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Predicting corporate bankruptcy or financial distress has been a vibrant topic in banking, 
business and finance because of its importance to creditors such as banks. For corporate debtors, 
management quality is a key factor in their performance. A firm’s bankruptcy or financial 
performance will affect investments and debt repayments, and therefore needs to be accurately 
predicted. It is not surprising that this topic has received a lot of attention in academic and 
practical work. Risk-taking decisions of creditors will depend on their ability to analyze or 
predict the risk involved. There is a vast body of literature on bankruptcy prediction models 
that can be classified into accounting based models using financial ratios (e.g. Altman (1968) 
and Bonfim (2009)) and market based models using share prices (e.g. Milne (2014) and 
Campbell et al. (2008)) respectively. Corporate governance measures are less common in 
bankruptcy prediction literature, as they do not represent hard information such as financial 
ratios, but rather soft information, although behaviors such as default on debt, financial distress 
and bankruptcy have been found to be linked to corporate governance (see e.g. Daily et al. 
(2003)). The research which aims to understand the role of corporate governance and 
subsequent company performance is summarized in the next section of this paper.  
However, we would like to take a different perspective on risk management, so that in 
addition to determining those measures of corporate governance that are statistically significant 
in explaining financial distress (whichhas been the main focus of previous studies), we will 
instead assess their predictive value rather than testing hypotheses. We have also taken into 
account the findings from Shumway (2001) and Campbell et al. (2008), who argue that cross-
sectional static models miss important details in structures that can vary across time. Therefore, 
this paper applies a dynamic prediction model to assess the relationships between various 
corporate governance measures and distress risk. It is a comprehensive and thorough study to 
use a large selection of corporate governance variables in a panel data structure over a 17-year 
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period. Furthermore, this paper addresses the association of government ownership with the 
risk of financial distress in the largest emerging market in the world. Since the data covers the 
period of the recent global financial crisis, and we incorporate macroeconomic variables. We 
believe that the established statistical relationships are robust over very different 
macroeconomic conditions, which is a requirement of the Basel Accords for risk management. 
In this way, we go beyond those very few studies that used the dynamic approach, to explore 
the role of a limited number of corporate governance measures in modelling financial distress 
(Wilson et al., 2014; Wilson et al., 2013). 
We find that aspects of board composition, ownership structure, management compensation 
and personal characteristics can have an impact on the risk of financial distress of a company 
and so can be used to predict it. But we establish that using corporate governance measures 
alone does not lead to sufficiently accurate predictions. If, however, they are bolstered by 
financial ratios, models can generate satisfactory predictions in advance. The best predictive 
model combines corporate governance measures, financial ratios and macroeconomic factors. 
This paper adds to the literature on credit risk assesment and corporate governance in three 
ways. First, we link corporate governance to risk management and examine the role and 
predictive power of a list of corporate governance measures, taking a different perspective to 
many previous governance studies. In the credit risk management paradigm, we focus on 
predictive power rather than causality. Our business failure prediction model captures not only 
the symptoms but also the causes of business distress/failure rooted in its governance, thus 
allowing us to predict more accurately. Second, we expand the empirical analysis into a new 
dimension - 33 governance variables in four groups and 2,824 companies over 17 years, which 
gives us great robustness in terms of statistics. The Basel Accord recommends that stress testing 
covers an economic cycle. Our data cover the recent financial crisis and out-of-sample 
validation has been applied. Third, we have built a dynamic model which has proven to be 
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theoretically better than static models (Shumway, 2001). The governance in a company is not 
stationary but changes over time. The dynamic model can catch the time effect.  
In Section 2, the main findings from previous research on aspects of corporate governance 
in the prediction of bankruptcy or financial distress are reviewed.  In Section 3 the econometric 
method, including the model specification, the sample, corporate governance measures and 
other variables are presented. In Section 4 we present the results, including the parameter 
estimates and predictive accuracy of four panel models. In Section 5 we discuss the empirical 
conclusions from our results and their implications for company owners and managers, 
practitioners and especially policy makers. 
 
2. Literature review 
Predicting corporate bankruptcy has a long history, ever since Altman (1968) introduced 
multiple discriminant analysis to this subject area and various subsequent methods were 
proposed to prevent potential losses for banks and detect financial crisis caused by financial 
risks. Although financial ratios have played a major role in modelling, scholars such as 
Shumway (2001) and Bonfim (2009) have continued looking for new methods and information 
to improve model performance. In recent years, the market price has been regarded as a 
forward-looking indicator and is frequently used to calculate the distance to default (Milne, 
2014). The influence of macroeconomic level factors on the performance of bank loan 
portfolios are also established and addressed by the New Basel Accord. Credit risks at the 
individual level can also be assessed by soft information related to corporate governance (Daily 
and Dalton, 1994b; Wilson et al., 2014). 
In this section we discuss the literature on credit management from the perspectives of board 
composition, ownership structure, management compensation and personal characteristics, as 
generally corporate governance involves a set of relationships between a company’s 
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management, its board, its shareholders and its stakeholders. It should be noted that corporate 
governance theories mainly relate to private companies; in State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) the 
situation is likely to be different. Therefore, SOE issues are discussed separately.  
 
2.1 Board composition and ownership structure 
The board of directors represent the top decision makers of a company, while the CEO takes 
care of daily operations. In some companies the CEO and the Chair of the Board may be the 
same person (described as duality), even though their roles are very different. Daily and Dalton 
(1994b) studied 50 pairs of bankrupt and non-bankrupt firms in three and five year horizons 
and found that the interaction of CEO/Chair duality and independent directors is positively 
related to bankruptcy. De Maere et al. (2014) also suggest that the separation of the Chair and 
the CEO can reduce the risk of bankruptcy.  
One can distinguish between inside directors (executive directors), grey directors (non-
independent non-executive directors) and outside directors (independent directors) on the board 
(Hsu and Wu, 2014). Some studies (Fich and Slezak, 2008; Hsu and Wu, 2014; Salloum et al., 
2013; Santen and Soppe, 2009) have discussed the influence of various directors on corporate 
bankruptcy/financial distress. The role of independent or outside directors on the board has 
received considerable attention over many years, since they are believed to strengthen the 
monitoring of firm performance and help to increase diversity. In the research of Li et al. (2008), 
independent directors turned out to be negatively associated with the probability of financial 
distress. On the contary, Hsu and Wu (2014) found that outside directors are unfavorable to 
firm survival and increase the likelihood of business failure, while grey directors do better at 
monitoring the board. Santen and Soppe (2009), in a case study relating to the Netherlands, 
showed that distressed firms have a higher percentage of independent directors in general. In 
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summary, the previous studies fail to reach a consensus on whether independent directors have 
a positive or negative effect on financial distress. 
The effect of board size has been explored by Daily and Dalton (1994a) and Jensen (1993), 
who suggested that small boards are more efficient and have lower productivity costs during 
any coordination process. This argument was later supported by Santen and Soppe (2009) in 
their empirical results. However, Darrat et al. (2016) found a mixed effect of board size: having 
a larger board reduces the risk of bankruptcy for complex firms with diverse business segments, 
but not for less diversified or single market oriented firms. In new IPO firms, Chancharat et al. 
(2012) using survival analysis found that either a small or a large board outperforms those 
middle-sized boards in terms of their company’s survival time. It seems the overall effect of 
board size is nonlinear.  
Ownership structure is a crucial aspect when judging corporate governance because it 
addresses the relationship between inside and outside investors. A great deal of research has 
addressed issues in ownership structure, for example the type of controller and institutional 
investor holding.  
Lee and Yeh (2004) in a Taiwanese case suggested that a concentrated ownership 
environment such as family ownership will lead to a greater chance of distress. In Taiwan, 
family control is very common, and this is also true in many other Asian countries. Claessens 
et al. (2000) and Salloum et al. (2013) have also addressed the issue of family control. In 
contrast to Lee and Yeh (2004), Wilson et al. (2013) in their UK study documented that family 
businesses are more likely to survive than nonfamily companies. In Mainland China, family 
controlled companies do exist, but there is not enough information to determine whether a 
company is a family business or not. State control is more relevant here and will be discussed 
separately in Section 2.3.  
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In addition to the type of ownership, the role of institutional shareholders has received 
attention, with mixed results. Lee and Yeh (2004) and Ting et al. (2008) found that institutional 
shareholding is lower in distressed companies than in healthy ones. This was confirmed by 
Campbell et al. (2008), who also found distress risk to be negatively linked to institutional 
ownership, though Fich and Slezak (2008) and Donker et al. (2009) found that institutional 
ownership has no relationship with bankruptcy. In their deep-dive study into how institutional 
shareholders participate in the board, Manzaneque, Priego and Merino (2016) found that 
directors appointed by pressure-resistant institutional shareholders have a negative impact on 
the likelihood of business failure. Institutional owners’ impact on directorships can correct 
mistakes to prevent firms going wrong. This effect is strong, particularly if they have 
concentrated ownership. Thus, apart from institutional shareholding, the shareholding of insider 
and block holders has also been tested in our study.  
 
2.2 Management compensation and personal characteristics 
Salary, bonus and options are three common forms of compensation for managers. 
Management compensation on the one hand represents the cost of a company’s human resource, 
while on the other hand, it is also an incentive for executives to pursue profits. Gilson and 
Vetsuypens (1993) found that in financially distressed firms a considerable number of CEOs 
were replaced or paid less than under normal circumstances. Management compensation was 
suggested to be a potentially significant variable in predicting financial distress. Li et al. (2008) 
also found that the administrative expense ratio was positively related to the likelihood of 
financial distress. However, using an equilibrium model, Cyert et al. (2002) reported that CEO 
compensation including base salary, equity and discretionary compensation was negatively 
associated with default risk. Basu et al. (2007) found that excess executive pay was negatively 




 Santen and Soppe (2009) incorporated the personal characteristics of directors in their 
prediction models in six dimensions: workload, nationality, dependency, interlinked 
directorships, age and education. From another perspective, Wilson et al. (2014) described 
director characteristics in terms of  networks, proximity and involvement. Their survival model 
on a large dataset of six million observations provided evidence of strong links between a 
director’s characteristics and the new business’ survival. In their data, having female board 
directors reduces the likelihood of insolvency because companies with female directors tend to 
have better cash flow and less debt. Khaw et al. (2016) added a comment that men were more 
likely to take excessive risks while women were more conservative.  
Educational background is likely to affect managerial performance. Higher education 
indicates a certain level of aptitude. Holding an MBA degree is evidence of both theoretical and 
practical experience in business management. D'Aveni (1990) and Daily and Dalton (1994a) 
used education to partly represent the quality of a board. They agreed that business education 
might affect the prestige of a company, but no study has yet linked education to the probability 
of financial distress directly.  
Experience is hard to measure since it is personal and unique. Even so some results can be 
gleaned. Wilson et al. (2014) concluded that directors with previous insolvency experience or 
recent resignations have a higher insolvency risk, while Salloum et al. (2013) found insufficient 
evidence to suggest that a shortage of experience in terms of years served had any such effect. 
For obvious reasons age is often used as a proxy for experience. Zahra and Pearce (1989) used 
age as one of the relevant characteristics in their study and found that it was linked to financial 
performance. Platt and Platt (2012) found that an increase in both the CEO’s age and the 
average age of the board decreased the chance of bankruptcy, but Fich and Slezak (2008) found 
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that only the CEO’s age is positively significant in one of their four bankruptcy prediction 
models. 
 
2.3 State Owned Enterprises 
Among the Chinese studies focused on corporate governance, there are some which have 
addressed the issue of state ownership. Under a central planning system, for example in 
Mainland China (McMillan, 2015), SOEs have dominated the economy in many important 
sectors such as banking, energy and transportation. SOEs have some inherent advantages: they 
do not have to fully cover expenses from sales and income; unprofitable SOEs and losses are 
subsidized; they receive funds from state-owned banks regardless of risks (Lin and Tan, 1999). 
While they reap all the advantages of being part of a planned economy and so rarely go bankrupt, 
agency theory implies that the interests of many levels of agents conflict with each other, 
because the state is both the regulator and the manager. Khaw et al. (2016) found that state 
controlled companies are less willing to take risks, which may lead to a lower chance of 
bankruptcy. Zeitun and Gang Tian (2007) suggested government ownership could be used as a 
predictor of probable default. However, their empirical results also showed that reducing 
government ownership could cause the bankruptcy of some companies in the short term. 
Maximizing the value of shareholder benefits is the ultimate goal for most companies, and, 
therefore, appropriate corporate governance can ensure investors receive a return on their 
investment (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Shleifer and Vishny (1997) also noticed that the agency 
problems in large companies in many countries were not only between investors and managers 
but also between outside investors and concentrated shareholders who have dominant or full 
control over the managers. In state-owned companies where the government has large 
concentrated shares, state ownership leads to problems of corruption and social responsibility. 
Therefore, state ownership is a double-edged sword: advantages and disadvantages interact to 
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influence firm performance. Further empirical evidence is required to establish the relationship 
between state ownership and financial distress.  
From the above we can see that although previous research has examined the relationships 
between corporate governance measures and financial distress, no consensus has been reached 
as to whether, which and how corporate governance variables affect the chance of financial 
distress. Different countries have different regulatory systems of company structure, increasing 
the complexity of analysis. In contrast to the Chinese study by Wang and Deng (2006) which 
is limited to small samples, a few variables and a cross-sectional analysis, this paper 
reinvestigates the relationship between corporate governance measures and the risk of financial 
distress, with a large panel dataset of 2,824 companies over 17 years covering the recent 
financial crisis, ensuring robustness of the modelling results. A wide range of corporate 
governance measures taken from board composition, ownership structure, management 
compensation and personal characteristics is represented by 33 potential predictive variables. 
The case of China provides an opportunity to address the issue of the role of state ownership, 
which has great impact on both the access to finance and the potential conflicts of agents. 
 
3. Method and data 
In terms of econometric methodology, one can classify past studies into those that have used 
static cross-sectional models and those that have used survival analysis. Studies that have used 
cross sectional models include Platt and Platt (2012), who compared means of governance 
attributes between bankrupt and non-bankrupt companies. Zeitun and Gang Tian (2007) used 
linear regression to investigate the relationship between default risk and governance structure. 
But the majority, for example Ciampi (2015), Daily and Dalton (1994a), Donker et al. (2009), 
Hsu and Wu (2014), Lee and Yeh (2004), not surprisingly, have applied logistic regression, 
which has worked well in this context.  
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However as noted by Shumway (2001), dynamic models such as survival analysis are 
superior to static models because dynamic models are able to employ multiple period data and 
time varying covariates (TVCs), and so enable the prediction of the probability of an event in a 
chosen future time period. Similar points are made by Bonfim (2009). In studies of corporate 
governance measures, De Maere et al. (2014), Chancharat et al. (2012) and Parker et al. (2002) 
employ Cox Proportional Hazard models. But these studies do not make predictions and they 
treat time as continuous, when data relating to the covariates is available only yearly, and so 
discrete time survival modelling would be more appropriate in this case. 
In the literature, it is noted that predictive accuracy is generally improved by the 
incorporation of corporate governance measures (Fich and Slezak, 2008; Lee and Yeh, 2004). 
However, research has been inconsistent or even controversial in the empirical findings, 
regarding whether a variable is positively or negatively associated with the probability of 
financial distress, and to what degree. In a more practical way, this research considers the 
predictive value of new corporate governance variables, in addition to reporting regression 
parameters. In this way the findings are more relevant for credit risk assessment. 
 
3.1 Model specification 
Covariates can be time varying across multiple periods, but most of them can only be 
observed at specific time, when economic and financial reports are disclosed. In this sense, the 
Cox Proportional hazard model as used in Parker et al. (2002) may be not suitable. We follow 
Shumway (2001) and assume a discrete time setting in modelling. Shumway (2001) proved that 
parameter estimate is the same as multi-period logistic regression, which is the maximum 
likelihood method. Unlike Bonfim (2009), who assumed covariates act in the same period of 
the dependent variable, a horizon of three years in advance is applied in this research. It is 
important to note that in the context of prediction, we are using current information and are 
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making predictions about the future. Given the fact that financial statements and 
macroeconomic statistics are in reality generally late in disclosure, and that the indicator of 
distress is applied for two consecutive bad performances, a lag of three years is reasonable in 
our econometric model. Thus, the regression model uses covariates from year -3t  to predict 
whether a company is distressed in year t , marked as 1d = . Therefore, the form of the survival 
model is specified as follows: 
1 0 0 1 , 3 2 , 3 3 , 3logit( ( )) ( ) + 
T T g T r T m
d i t i t i th t h tα β= − − −= + + +β x β x β x   ,                      (1)   
where t  is the survival time; 
          1( )dh t=  is the probability of distress at time t ; 
          0 ( )h t  is the baseline hazard in duration at time t  and 0β  is its coefficient; 
          , 3
g
i t−x  is a column vector of corporate governance variables for company i  at time 3t − ; 
        , 3
r
i t−x  is a column vector of financial ratios of predictive power; 
        , 3
m
i t−x  is a column vector of macroeconomic factors; 
        1 2 3, ,β β β  are vectors of coefficients; 
          α  is the constant. 
It should be noted that credit risk prediction models do not necessarily have to control other 
influences, so no control variables are included in the regression equation of survival analysis. 
All the independent variables in Equation (1) are regarded as potentially predictive variables. 
In the analytical process, first, considering the potential collinearity between governance 
measures, we include each group of corporate governance measures separately into the 
regression without any other covariates. In this way, significant corporate governance measures 
are identified and retained in the first prediction model (Model 1). The second model uses 
financial ratios only (Model 2), and the third model combines both significant corporate 
governance measures and financial ratios (Model 3). Model 4 further incorporates 
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macroeconomic factors. The predictive accuracy is assessed by the Receiver Operation 
Characteristics (ROC) curves, the Area Under the ROC Curve (AUC) and the Kolmogorov–
Smirnov (KS) statistic, the latter two of which are both commonly used in predictive modelling 
and credit risk management and range from 0 to 1, with a higher value indicating better results. 
Four groups of results of both in-sample and out-of-sample predictions are given for 
comparison (Table 1). 




Model 1  Survival model with corporate governance measures only 
Model 2  Survival model with financial ratios only 
Model 3 Survival model with governance measures and financial ratios 




‘Special Treatment’ is imposed by the regulator China Securities Regulatory Commission 
(CSRC) to give investors notice of potential risks. This therefore represents an official indicator 
of financial distress of listed companies. A listed company can be filed in Special Treatment 
for any of these reasons: (1) negative net profit in the most recent two consecutive years; (2) 
failure to disclose its annual report; (3) likelihood of being dissolved; (4) reorganisation, 
settlement or bankruptcy liquidation. In over 80% of our cases, the companies in Special 
Treatment suffered net losses in two consecutive years. So it is a popular indicator of financial 
distress, as in Geng et al. (2015), Lin et al. (2016) etc.. The Wind and GTA databases provide 
access to annual statements including accounting and governance information. The original 
dataset contains 3,647 companies listed in China since 1991. Due to the late disclosure of 
governance information only after 2002, the data is restricted to 2003 onwards. The final sample 
consists of 2,824 companies over 17 years between 2003 and 2019.  
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Predictions for financial distress are commonly validated by an independent sample to avoid 
overfitting (Lin et al., 2016). Therefore, the whole sample is randomly divided into a training 
set and a test set in a 2:1 ratio. Applying a stratified sampling strategy to both distress and non-
distress groups to ensure that both samples have similar distress rates (1.60% and 1.59%), as 
shown in Table 2. There are 19,844 observations for the training sample and 9,919 observations 
for the test sample, 29,763 firm-years in total.  
Table 2  
Sample description 
 
Training Sample  Test Sample 




 Year Distress No. of 
Obs. 
Distress 
rate  0 1   0 1 
2003 670 28 698 4.01% 
 
2003 341 14 355 3.94% 
2004 717 18 735 2.45% 2004 363 9 372 2.42% 
2005 708 19 727 2.61% 2005 361 6 367 1.63% 
2006 721 32 753 4.25% 2006 365 14 379 3.69% 
2007 771 35 806 4.34% 2007 381 13 394 3.30% 
2008 814 9 823 1.09% 2008 399 7 406 1.72% 
2009 863 14 877 1.60% 2009 424 5 429 1.17% 
2010 1068 23 1091 2.11% 2010 528 8 536 1.49% 
2011 1234 7 1241 0.56% 2011 626 3 629 0.48% 
2012 1318 14 1332 1.05% 2012 668 8 676 1.18% 
2013 1312 7 1319 0.53% 2013 662 7 669 1.05% 
2014 1383 12 1395 0.86% 2014 687 13 700 1.86% 
2015 1516 12 1528 0.79% 2015 751 8 759 1.05% 
2016 1637 15 1652 0.91% 2016 816 11 827 1.33% 
2017 1623 14 1637 0.86% 2017 808 8 816 0.98% 
2018 1607 16 1623 0.99% 2018 797 11 808 1.36% 
2019 1570 37 1607 2.30% 2019 787 10 797 1.25% 
Total 19532 312 19844 1.60%  Total 9764 155 9919 1.59% 
 
3.3 Corporate governance measures 
Argenti (1976) summarized six structural defects indicated by the experts: one-man rule, 
non-participating board, unbalanced top team, lack of management depth, weak finance 
function and combined chairman-chief executive. For instance, ‘one-man rule’ is used to 
describe a CEO who dominates their colleagues rather than leading them in making decisions 
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or listening to their advice. On some occasions, some of the functional directors who sit on 
main boards do not carry out their responsibilities. The ‘top team' includes directors, senior 
executives and advisors who may be not evenly balanced in terms of their backgrounds or 
abilities. These situations are rooted in the management of a company and we source the proxies 
of governance from them to describe the board, the ownership and the senior management team.  
Finally, as discussed in the literature review and according to the availability of data in the 
database, corporate governance variables are classified into four groups and explained in Table 
3. Lee and Yeh (2004) discussed the issue of ultimate control, which is very common in the 
emerging markets where highly concentrated shares are held by a family or the state. Claessens 
et al. (2000) suggested that the controlling shareholder needs to be considered in bankruptcy 
prediction models. In our study, the ultimate controller is determined according to the CSRC 
regulations. Therefore, the ultimate controller acts as the indicator to denote whether a company 
is an SOE. We also consider the connection between large shareholders. According to Platt and 
Platt (2012), interlinked directorship provides benefits for the company. 
Table 3 
Corporate governance measures 
 
Variable Definition 
Board composition (6)   
Board size Total number of all directors 
Independent director Proportion of independent board directors 
Number of supervisors  Number of supervisors 
Number of senior managers  Number of senior managers 
Duality of Chair and CEO 1 if the Chair and the CEO is the same person 
Independent director monitoring 1 if most independent directors work at the company address 
Ownership Structure (10)   
State ownership Proportion of state-owned shares to total shares 
SOE 1 if the ultimate controller is the government or state agencies 
Board shares Proportion of shares held by the board to total shares 
Supervisor shares Proportion of shares held by the supervision board to total shares 
Top 10 shareholders Proportion of shares held by ten largest shareholders to total shares 
Institutional share holding Proportion of institutional shares to total shares 
Average share holding Average shareholding to total shares 
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Listing elsewhere 1 if the company is listed on other exchanges 
Share capital change 1 if it has changed from the previous year 
Large shareholder connection 1 if ten largest shareholders are related 
Management Compensation (5)   
Salary of seniors 
Proportion of salary of directors, supervisors and senior managers to total 
salary costs 
Salary of top 3 directors Proportion of salary of top 3 directors to total salary costs 
Salary of top 3 seniors 
Proportion of salary of top 3 directors, supervisors and senior managers to 
total salary costs 
Salary of top 3 senior managers Proportion of salary of top 3 senior managers to total salary costs 
Number of non-paid seniors Number of non-paid directors, supervisors and senior managers 
Personal characteristics (12)   
Chair age Age in the year 
Chair female 1 if female, 0 otherwise 
Chair postgraduate 1 if postgraduate, 0 otherwise 
Chair professional qualification 1 if holding any professional qualification 
Chair paid 1 if paid 
Chair concurrent post 1 if holding a position in other companies 
CEO age Age in the year 
CEO female 1 if female, 0 otherwise 
CEO postgraduate 1 if postgraduate, 0 otherwise 
CEO professional qualification 1 if holding any professional qualification 
CEO paid 1 if paid 
CEO concurrent post 1 if holding a position in other companies 
 
Regarding management compensation, constrained by the availability of data, the data source 
only provides a small fraction of option incentive information, the quality of which is very low. 
No option incentive is considered here. We only have access to the salaries of the management 
team. In China, most bonuses are included within salaries in financial statements.  
Whilst some papers (Fich and Slezak, 2008; Platt and Platt, 2012) are interested in the CEO, 
and some (Santen and Soppe, 2009) are interested in the board directors, this research takes 
both into account. Generally, the CEO is authorized by the board and is responsible for the 
overall management, decision making, execution and the daily operation of the company. 
Therefore, the personality and characteristics of the CEO will be reflected in the development 
of the business. In the case that the Chair of the board has control of the company and is more 
involved in management and decision making, the Chair will have more influence on 
performance, a fact which should not be ignored. 
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Personal information concerning both the Chair and the CEO for each company is recorded 
in the database, including information regarding demographics (age, gender, and education) 
and their professions: whether they have professional qualifications, whether they get paid by 
the company and whether they possess a position in any other organization.  
 
3.4 Financial ratios and macroeconomic variables 
As the BASEL Accord II addressed, macroeconomy as a systemic factor has an impact on 
the business cycle, so it is necessary for banks to consider it in their Probability of Default 
models with the Internal Rating-Based Approach (IRB). Though our focus is on governance 
variables, we have still incorporated financial ratios and macroeconomic factors in our analysis 
because they are significant to credit risk assessment (Wang, 2019). For the selection of 
potential financial ratios and macroeconomic factors, out of a range of potential ones, we 
consider the recommendations in the literature, the significance in preliminary analysis and the 
correlation in collinearity diagnostics in the selection process. 
The first group of TVCs are financial ratios covering different aspects of a company. In the 
literature, popular aspects to be assessed in financial ratio analysis are profitability, liability, 
gearing, operations etc.. Therefore Return on Assets, Tangible Assets / Total Assets, Current 
Liabilities / Total Liabilities, Cash Flow from Operation / Total Liabilities, Receivables 
Turnover and Total Assets Growth are selected with reference to their predictive power in the 
preliminary analysis. A series of macroeconomic factors make up the other group of TVCs. 
However, unlike firm-specific covariates which affect individual cases, macroeconomic factors 
are systematic components which vary over time. For all companies existing in a period, 
macroeconomic conditions have the same impact on each and have been a major driver of credit 
risk for banks. We incorporate lagged annualized values of GDP growth, the unemployment 
rate, the inflation rate and the base borrowing interest rate, which are extracted from the World 
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Databank (the database of the World Bank). The Stock Index of CSI300 is included as we are 
focusing on listed companies. In accordance with Shumway (2001) which also involves listed 
companies in the sample, duration time in survival analysis is determined as the time since 
listing on the exchange, and the natural logarithm of the duration is chosen to be the baseline 
function.  
 
3.5 Data description 
Table 4 shows the descriptive statistics of the continuous variables. On average, there are 
9.12 directors on the board, of which 36% are independent directors. There are on average 3.81 
supervisors and 7.14 senior managers in each listed company. The government holds about 
12.75% of the total shares, which has gradually decreased after years of reform, though many 
of them are still SOEs, even if the state processes only a small proportion of shares in a company. 
Supervisors still own relatively small proportions of the shares (0.45%) because some of them 
are shareholder and employee representatives. On average, the top 10 shareholders own over 
half of the total shares (58.76%) and so are often block holders who make important decisions. 
Institutional shareholders hold a large percentage of all shares (31.3%), in some cases up to 
98.63% of the total shares. In terms of age, the Chair is on average older than the CEO by four 
years.  
Table 4  
Description of corporate governance measures 1 
 
Variable No. of Obs. Mean 
Std.  
Dev. Min Max 
Board composition      
Board size 22475 9.12 1.91 3.00 19.00 
Independent director (%) 22475 36.09 5.01 6.67 50.00 
Number of supervisors  22475 3.81 1.27 1.00 14.00 
Number of senior managers  22475 7.14 2.48 1.00 44.00 
Ownership structure      
State ownership (%) 22475 12.75 21.47 0.00 92.19 
Board shares (%) 22475 3.01 6.33 0.00 98.97 
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Supervisor shares (%) 22475 0.45 0.40 0.00 13.23 
Top 10 shareholders (%) 22475 58.76 15.16 11.26 99.48 
Institutional share holding (%) 22475 31.30 24.56 0.00 98.63 
Average share holding (%) 22475 0.11 1.48 0.00 84.70 
Management compensation      
Salary of seniors (%) 22475 22.24 18.29 0.00 60.00 
Salary of top 3 directors (%) 22475 12.00 11.17 0.00 35.00 
Salary of top 3 seniors (%) 22475 10.45 11.59 0.00 39.99 
Salary of top 3 senior managers (%) 22475 11.43 13.03 0.00 49.96 
Number of non-paid seniors 22475 3.42 3.02 0.00 19.00 
Personal characteristics      
Chair Age 22475 51.59 7.26 26 85 
CEO Age 22475 47.82 6.56 24 79 
 
For categorical governance variables, we present only their frequencies and percentages in 
Table 5. It should be noted that the incidence in Table 5 is counted by firm year but not company 
case, however it is still surprising to find that in over two thirds of observations (firm-year), 
companies are state controlled. 
Table 5  
Description of corporate governance measures 2 
 
Variable No. of Obs. 
Dummy 
0 (% of total) 1 (% of total) 
0 1 
Board composition      
Duality of Chair and CEO 22475 17705 4770 78.78  21.22  
Independent director monitoring 22475 12089 10386 53.79  46.21  
Ownership structure      
SOE 22475 14094 8381 62.71  37.29  
Listing elsewhere 22475 18180 4295 80.89  19.11  
Large shareholder connection 22475 11746 10729 52.26  47.74  
Personal characteristics      
Chair female 22475 21514 961 95.72  4.28  
Chair postgraduate 22475 13480 8995 59.98  40.02  
Chair qualification 22475 8761 13714 38.98  61.02  
Chair paid 22475 6327 16148 28.15  71.85  
Chair concurrent position 22475 4856 17619 21.61  78.39  
CEO female 22475 21264 1211 94.61  5.39  
CEO postgraduate 22475 21999 476 97.88  2.12  
CEO professional qualification 22475 9689 12786 43.11  56.89  
CEO paid 22475 483 21992 2.15  97.85  




Financial ratios and macroeconomic factors (Table 6) are transformed into percentages for 
ease of interpretation and comparison. Generally, if looking exclusively at the means, Chinese 
listed companies have been achieving positive returns and growing in the past few years. The 
Chinese economy has been growing comparatively quickly for decades while keeping inflation 
and unemployment rates at relatively low levels.  
Collinearity between explanatory variables could lead to potential problems in testing the 
significance of covariates. In this study, there is no pair of variables with a high correlation over 
0.6, and between corporate governance and financial ratios all Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) 
are smaller than 3, with an average of 1.57. 
Table 6  
Description of Time Varying Covariates 
 
Variable No. of Obs. Mean SD Min Max 
Financial ratios      
Return on Assets 22475 6.28  6.24  -16.83  29.14  
Tangible Assets / Total Assets 22475 46.33  22.59  -29.99  97.04  
Current Assets / Current Liabilities 22475 81.71  17.35  4.24  100  
Cash Flow from Operation / Total Liabilities 22475 17.17  32.95  -128.42  164.55  
Receivables Turnover 22475 27.74  59.23  0.95  299.69  
Total Assets Growth 22475 21.52  34.81  -69.41  150.78  
Macroeconomic factors      
GDP Growth 22475 0.09  0.02  0.07  0.14  
Inflation Rate 22475 2.65  1.65  -0.73  5.93  
Unemployment Rate 22475 4.11  0.09  4.00  4.30  
Interest Rate 22475 4.05  0.75  2.93  5.81  
Stock Index 22475 17.70  54.46  -66.95  161.55  
 
4. Results 
4.1 Model results 
Measures of different aspects of corporate governance were entered into the models block 
by block and assessed by their significance. Only significant variables were retained. Model 1 
consists of eight corporate governance measures, one from the board composition category, 
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four from ownership structure, one from management compensation, and two from personal 
characteristics (Table 7). Model 2 includes six financial ratios, and all appear to be significant 
in predicting financial difficulty and are showing their expected signs. In Model 3, all 
significant corporate governance measures and financial ratios are combined, and all remain 
significant with the same signs as in Model 1 and Model 2. In Model 4, macroeconomic factors 
are added and significant except GDP Growth.  
We find that the monitoring of independent directors affects corporate performance. If they 
are present on site and serve their duties well, the risk of poor managerial decisions can be 
reduced. This finding is similar to that in Wilson et al. (2013), who found that if directors live 
close to their companies, they are better able to monitor management. Long distances indicate 
loose control and monitoring. The proportion held by the board is positively associated with the 
risk of distress. It is also evident that if the large shareholders are interlinked, it damages overall 
performance. The company needs diverse information to make the right decisions, and effective 
monitoring is thus essential for a company’s health. 
Table 7  
Model results 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 































































Tangible assets / total assets  -0.019*** -0.021*** -0.019*** 
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(-3.77) (-4.72) (-4.39) 




























GDP Growth    2.694 (0.40) 
Inflation Rate    0.182
* 
(2.18) 
Unemployment Rate    1.969
*** 
(1.87) 
Interest Rate    -0.451
** 
(-2.71) 











Log likelihood -1160.09 -1157.02 -1117.32 -1109.54 
Number of observations      14272 14272 14272 14272 
LR Chi-sq 94.99 79.26 142.51 154.75 
Prob >  Chi-sq             0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
* p-value<0.1, ** p-value<0.05, *** p-value<0.01  
 
We also find that if the company is state controlled, it has a lower chance of becoming 
distressed. This may be taken as evidence that the government has provided abundant resources 
to support the company. Interestingly, the significant variable is the indicator of SOE but not 
the proportion of state-owned shares to total shares. In China, the reform of SOEs has been 
implemented over the last thirty years. The state has gradually exited the SOEs by restructuring 
and returning them to the market. Though ownership and management is separated, we can still 
see that the state controls some larger firms and those in key sectors, even though their 
ownership is low. The positive effects are still there, particularly when the market is declining. 
SOEs in general rarely suffer financial hardship.  
The results also suggest that when the institutional investor has a stake in a listed company, 
the chances of distress are lower. The institutional investors have expertise and skills in 
detecting companies worthy of investment. According to Ting et al. (2008), the existence of 
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institutional investors, particularly foreign institutional investors, exerts pressure on auditors so 
the auditing reports will show signs of creditworthiness. Further, if the salary cost of top seniors 
is great, the company has a high risk of financial distress. There may be two reasons for this. 
On the one hand, the salary cost for senior staff places a burden on a company’s financial 
condition. On the other hand, high incentives may lead the managers to pay more attention to 
short term profits rather than long term benefits. Of the six characteristics identified for both 
the Chair and the CEO, only two are truly significant: the Chair’s age and the indicator of the 
Chair’s concurrent post. As the Chair grows older, their experience increases and they become 
more cautious than young entrepreneurs. When the Chair holds another position in other 
organizations, they presumably possess more social relationships and resources and so can 
bring extra benefits for the company.  
 
4.2 Predictive accuracy 
As discussed previously, predictive accuracy is the true focus of credit management, and its 
measurement is presented in Table 8. Four panels are compared and Panel A gives results for 
the model training sample. Unsurprisingly, in-sample prediction produces the best results, as 
compared to the out-of-sample predictions. 
AUC measures the discriminant power between the distress and non-distressed groups, 
which is equivalent to the Gini coefficient. The performance of Model 1 with only governance 
measures is insufficient in the training sample (AUC=0.678) and the test sample (AUC=0.655). 
An AUC larger than 0.7 indicates a good predition on a binary outcome. This means that using 
only corporate governance measures to predict financial distress is not practical. As only six 
ratios are selected into the predictive model, their performance (Model 1) are only slightly better 
than governance measures (Model 2). When these two groups of variables are combined in 
Model 3, predictive accuracy is much improved. A significant increase is recorded in AUC, 
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from 0.707 to 0.766 in the training sample, and a marginal improvement from 0.697 to 0.717 
in the test sample. The best performance comes from Model 4, where corporate governance 
measures, financial ratios and macroeconomic factors are all used in the model. The differences 
between Models 3 and 4 are trivial but still noticeable. The AUC in the training sample 
increases from 0.766 to 0.771 and that of the the test sample increases from 0.714 to 0.717. 
Table 8  
Predictive accuracy of models 
 
 Panel A Panel B 
AUC KS AUC KS 
Model 1 0.687 0.291 0.655 0.270 
Model 2 0.707 0.355 0.697 0.293 
Model 3 0.766 0.393 0.714 0.327 
Model 4 0.771 0.402 0.717 0.347 
 
The KS statistic is also a measure of discriminant power, but it is distinct from AUC in that 
the KS indicates the best difference between the True Positive Rate and the False Positive Rate 
when the cutoff varies from the minimum to the maximum possible values. We find that the 
trends of performance from Model 1 to Model 4 remain the same.  
In a further graphic analysis, we can see that in Figure 1, though the lines of models cross 
each other, generally Models 3 & 4 outperform Models 1 & 2 in the training sample. In the test 
sample, the lines of four models are rather compact. Nevertheless Model 4, which takes into 
consideration governance measures, financial ratios and macroeconomic factors is clearly the 
best. Models 3 & 4 are consistently better than Models 1 & 2 across all years. The graphs of 
KS are displayed when all potential cutoffs change, and the differences of the True Positive 
Rate and the False Positive Rate peak at different points. From the distances of vertical lines in 
Figure 2, the power of extra information is evident in our empirical results.  
Figure 1  





(a) Training sample (b) Test sample 
 
Figure 2 
Model performance: KS statistic 
 




(b) Test sample 
 
5. Discussion and conclusion 
Over the past 20 years corporate governance has attracted wide academic attention in many 
disciplines, most of which have found that certain aspects of the corporate governance of a 
company are linked to its corporate performance or its financial position. From the perspective 
of bankruptcy/distress prediction, this paper has tested a wide range of corporate governance 
measures as predictors of corporate credit risk, using four panels of 17 years for 2,824 
companies using discrete time survival models.  
In search of the causes of corporate failure, Argenti (1976) did an in-depth survey and 
unearthed a universal truth, that bad management is the prime cause of failure. We regard what 
was described as ‘bad management’ to be ‘poor governance’, as the term ‘governance’ was not 
popular at the time of the book. Traits of bad governance include one-man rule, a non-
participating board, an unbalanced top team, lack of management depth, weak finance function 
and a combined chairman-CEO. These behaviors are captured by our corporate governance 
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measures and results show consistent evidence. Argenti (1976) described the channel from 
corporate governance to financial distress, so that poor governance leads to the inability of the 
management team to correct mistakes (due to one-man rule, chair-CEO duality, problematic 
board/management team etc.), and so finally causes the company to fail. In the process of 
distress to bankruptcy, some common symptoms are observed. For example, financial ratios 
behave worse compared to others. However, financial ratios as symptoms may be delayed in 
disclosure. In order to be able to give early warning, we have to go to the root – the governance 
of a company. In our empirical results, though we do not focus on this hypothesis, the channel 
is well-established, as many empirical studies have shown, for example, Daily and Dalton (1994) 
and Fich and Slezak (2008), etc. 
In the dynamic prediction model, thirty-three corporate governance measures are considered, 
which cover four aspects of a company management: board composition, ownership structure, 
management compensation, and director and manager characteristics. First, our results show 
that in terms of board composition, the monitoring of independent directors is significantly 
associated with the risk of financial distress. Independent directors are expected to carry out 
their duties so they can effectively provide suggestions and improve performance based on their 
knowledge of other companies. Second, state ownership and institutional ownership reduce the 
risk of a company becoming financially distressed. Active investors such as institutional 
shareholders have the ability to detect potential risks to a company in which they have large 
investments. This is consistent with the literature in Campbell et al. (2008), Lee and Yeh (2004) 
and Ting et al. (2008). However the connection of large shareholders and too many shares held 
by the board do not benefit the creditors. Third, in terms of management compensation, the 
risks are greater when senior staff are more highly paid, because this indicates that salaries have 
become burdens to firms. Fourth, regarding personal characteristics, when the Chair is older, 
 
28 
and when the Chair holds other positions in other organizations, the risk of distress is lower. 
Furthermore, depending on six financial ratios, macroeconomic factors affect the risk of distress.  
In terms of predictive accuracy, corporate governance measures alone have limited capacity 
to detect financial distress. Financial ratios alone do relatively better. However, when 
wecombine the two, the predictive accuracy is significantly improved. The best predictive 
model comes from the combination of corporate governance measures, financial ratios and 
macroeconomic factors. This outperforms the other three models in the out-of-sample 
prediction. The differences are clear in the figures of ROC and KS. 
In identifying measures of corporate governance which are significantly linked to financial 
distress, these empirical results directly address issues of effective monitoring, business 
prosperity and the prevention of corporate collapse, and thus have important implications for 
financial stability in practice. Such information is helpful, first of all, for creditors in preventing 
potential losses, and also for owners and managers in identifying problems and implementing 
changes accordingly. It is also relevant to the corporate governance responsibilities of 
shareholders and stakeholders and those of regulators who supervise listed and other types of 
companies, specifically regarding aspects of state ownership and independent directors. Finally, 
corporate governance is closely linked to government policies and legal requirements that 
ensure financial prudence and stable economic performance, so our results should also be of 
interest to policy makers and governments in the formulating of enterprise development 
strategy and its enforcement.  
Finally we have focused on China in this study, since it represents the largest emerging 
market in the world. China is unequalled in terms of economic development. Its stock market 
is relatively young, going back less than 30 years. For this reason it shares many common 
patterns in the capital market with many other emerging markets. We believe that our findings 
will provide insight for all developing countries, particularly for those in Asia, where some of 
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the cultural and political issues are shared. For example, SOEs in Vietnam also contribute a 
significant portion to its economy. We also understand the fact that in the past few years, China 
has accumulated more and more debt in nearly all markets, such as municiple bonds, corporate 
debts and home loans. We have seen many defaults in the bonds market, even for state-owned 
agencies. Given this potential debt problem, we urgently need an early warning system, i.e. a 
predictive model to help protect creditors. Our model framework can be also developed to 
assess the risk in the bond market and prevent the debt crisis. 
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